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Sterlization, Retardation, and Parental Authority 
Sterilization is a multifaceted, extremely complex topic 
embracing a variety of issues and concerns ranging from morality 
and propriety to constitutionality. Very few, if any, of the issues 
surrounding the sterilization controversy can be said to be mat- 
ters of settled doctrine. This Comment will explore in detail only 
one aspect of the controvery-the power of a parent to consent to 
the sexual sterilization1 of his mentally retarded2 minor child ab- 
sent any specific statutory authorization to do so. 
Sterilization of mentally retarded minors upon the request 
and consent of their parents involves many basic interests and 
values. Parental discretion in directing the upbringing and care 
of children is one such value. A sometimes contrasting interest is 
the basic right of every person to choose for himself whether or 
not he will bear or beget children, absent compelling considera- 
tions which dictate that this right should be limited. In pursuit 
of a resolution of the potential conflicts between parent and child 
in this area, this Comment will first briefly survey the current law 
and attitudes concerning sterilization and then examine the com- 
mon law parent-child relationship in an attempt to discover 
whether or not that relationship endows a parent with the author- 
ity to have his retarded child sterilized. This inquiry will lead to 
a discussion of the policy considerations relevant to determining 
whether a parent should have this authority. Finally, recommen- 
-- 
1. "Sterilization," as it is used throughout this Comment, refers to any of a number 
of surgical procedures by means of which a male or female is rendered permanently 
incapable of bearing or begetting children. The more common sexual sterilization proce- 
dures are vasectomy for the male and hysterectomy and tuba1 ligation for the female. See 
21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Sexual Sterilization 9 5  3, 5 ,  6, 11, 12 (1968). 
A sterilization operation might be sought for eugenic purposes (to prevent hereditary 
transmission of genetic defects), contraceptive purposes (to terminate the capacity to 
procreate for any of a variety of possible reasons), or therapeutic purposes (to preserve the 
life or health of the patient). This Comment deals only with sterilization performed for 
eugenic or contraceptive purposes. Therapeutic sterilization can be independently justi- 
fied on health grounds and is not within the scope of this paper. 
2. The term "mentally retarded" is a vague term, with a myriad of possible mean- 
ings. The concept was defined by the American Association on Mental Deficiency (1973): 
"Mental Retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning 
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during the devel- 
opmental period." PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION 
PAST AND PRESENT 143 (1977). In common parlance, it is generally thought to refer to any 
person with an IQ that is below average. The difficulties and inconsistencies involved in 
labeling mental retardation are discussed in the text accompanying notes 114-32 infra. 
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dations will be made for the basic components of a comprehensive 
sterilization statute. 
A. Voluntary Sterilization3 
Many states, either by statute4 or court dec i~ ion ,~  expressly 
allow a legally competent adult to be sterilized a t  his own voli- 
tion, and the remaining states would probably not take any ac- 
tion to prevent such a voluntary sterilization. Although the 
United States Supreme Court has not yet found it necessary to 
address the precise question, i t  is likely that the right of a compe- 
tent person to voluntarily subject himself to sterilization falls 
within the constitutional right of privacy espoused in Griswold u. 
Connecticut6 and subsequent cases. In Griswold, the Supreme 
Court declared that there is a right of privacy protected by several 
constitutional guarantees and the penumbras emanating from 
them.' In Roe v. Wade,Vhe Court elaborated this concept by 
explaining that the right of privacy protects activities relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education? Then, in Carey v. Population Services 
International,lo the Court emphasized that "[tlhe decision 
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at  the very heart of .  . . 
constitutionally protected  choice^."^^ This broad area of constitu- 
tionally protected privacy will almost certainly be interpreted as 
extending to decisions regarding sterilization of oneself. At least 
one state court has suggested that this is so.12 
3. Voluntary sterilization refers to any sterilization performed pursuant to the volun- 
tary, informed consent of a competent person. Although a voluntary sterilization can be 
performed for eugenic or therapeutic reasons, the term normally refers to contraceptive 
sterilization. See note 1 supra. 
4. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 435.305 (1977); VA. CODE 4 32-423 (Supp. 1977). 
5. E.g., Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1969); 
Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972). 
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court held that a statute forbidding the use 
of contraceptives violated the constitutionally protected right of privacy. Id. a t  483-86. 
7. Id. at  484-85. 
8. 410 U S .  113 (1973). The Court in Roe held that the right of privacy is broad enough 
to cover the decision of a pregnant woman to obtain an abortion. I t  determined, however, 
that this right is not absolute and that compelling state interests such as protection of 
health, medical standards, and prenatal life become dominant a t  certain points during 
pregnancy. Id. a t  153-54. 
9. Id. a t  152-53. 
10. 431 U S .  678 (1977). Carey invalidated a New York statute which proscribed the 
sale or distribution of contraceptives to  minors under the age of 16 and prohibited anyone 
other than a licensed pharmacist from distributing contraceptives to persons over age 16. 
11. Id. a t  685. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U S .  438, 453 (1972). 
12. Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 748, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366 
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B. Compulsory Sterilization Statutes 
The statutes of twenty-four states still retain provisions for 
the compulsory sterilization of mentally defective persons.13 Al- 
though most of these statutes have not yet been tested in court, 
their constitutionality rests on Supreme Court precedent. Ever 
since Mr. Justice Holmes' now-famous 1927 declaration in Buck 
u. Bellt4 that "[t] hree generations of imbeciles are enough, "15 
involuntary sterilization statutes have generally been upheld as 
a valid exercise of the police power of the state.16 Although the 
legal authority for these statutes remains viable, however, it by 
no means remains unchallenged. The decision in Buck, upholding 
Virginia's compulsory sterilization statute, was premised on the 
supposed hereditary nature of feeblemindedness, a pervasive be- 
lief of that day.17 Most of today's authorities, however, doubt that 
most types of mental retardation are hereditary,18 and many 
scholars surmise that the holding of Buck v. Bell would be re- 
versed if the Court were to reconsider it today.l"dditionally, 
some involuntary sterilization statutes have been invalidated on 
the grounds that they failed to satisfy the constitutional guaran- 
tees of procedural due processz0 or equal p r o t e ~ t i o n . ~ ~  Also, as 
(1969). See also Ferro v. Lavine, 46 A.D.2d 313, 362 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1974); Casey & Rob- 
bins, Patients' Rights, 1974-1975 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 303,319-20; Comment, A Constitu- 
tional Evaluation of Statutory and Administrative Impediments to Voluntary 
Sterilization, 14 J. FAM. L. 67, 74-77 (1975). 
13. Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-evaluation, 14 J .  
FAM. L. 280, 280 n.2 (1975). 
14. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
15. Id. at  207. 
16. E.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 
221 S.E.2d 307 (1976); Cook v. State, 9 Or. App. 224,495 P.2d 768 (1972). But see Osborne 
v. Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 185 A.D. 902, 171 
N.Y.S. 1094 (1918). 
17. See Comment, Sexual Sterilization: A New Rationale?, 26 ARK. L. REV. 353,353- 
56 (1972) [hereinafter cited as New Rationale]. 
18. Notes 133-42 and accompanying text infra. 
19. E.g., Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 591, 596 (1966); Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 
62 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 921-24 (1974). 
20. E.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973); In re Opinion of 
Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935); Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 
(1921); In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942). The minimum due 
process safeguards that would seem to be required by Buck and these decisions are (1) a 
finding that the operation is in the best interests of the person to be sterilized or of soci- 
ety; (2) reasonable notice, including notice to the parents or guardian of a minor or incom- 
petent; (3) a hearing; (4) representation; (5) opportunity for confrontation and cross- 
examination; and (6) the availability of appellate review. 
21. E.g:, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 
201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918); Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 85 
3801 STERILIZATION AND PARENTAL AUTHORITY 383 
applied to criminals, a few such statutes have been invalidated 
as a form of cruel and unusual p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~  
Although most sterilization statutes were passed under the 
same questionable presumption relied on by the Supreme Court 
in Buck, today they are defended on other grounds, such as the 
state's interest in preventing the birth of children to unfit par- 
e n t ~ ; ~ ~  and it is possible that the Supreme Court would uphold 
these statutes on such a ground. These justifications, however, 
have been criticized by some who feel that most of the existing 
statutes could still not satisfy the required "compelling state in- 
terest testeUz4 The criticisms of compulsory sterilization statutes 
may be regarded as further evidence of the growing sentiment 
that procreation is a fundamental right that should not be in- 
fringed by the state, either by prohibiting voluntary or by compel- 
ling involuntary sterilization. 
C. Court Ordered Sterilization Absent Statutory Authorization 
Many courts have been presented with petitions to order or 
authorize the sterilization of mentally retarded persons when no 
state statute specifically authorized the court to grant the re- 
quests. Such petitions have been filed by parents, guardians, and 
public officersz5 seeking to have a minorz6 or adultn child or ward 
sterilized. These cases have not generally wrestled with the power 
of a parent to consent to the operation, but rather with the power 
N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913); Osborne v. Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. 
Ct.), aff'd mem., 185 A.D. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918). 
22. E.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) (statute allowing sterilization 
of criminal convicted of rape); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (statute 
requiring vasectomy upon any man twice convicted of a felony), rev'd on other grounds, 
242 U S .  468 (1917). 
23. See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. 
Supp. 451, 458 (M.D.N.C. 1976); In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 102-03, 221 
S.E.2d 307, 312-13 (1976); Cook v. State, 9 Or. App. 224, 230,495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (1972); 
Ferster, supra note 19, a t  601-02; Comment, Sexual Sterilization-Constitutional Validity 
of Involuntary Sterilization and Consent Determinative of Voluntariness, 40 Mo. L. REV. 
509, 515-20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sexual Sterilization]. 
24. See, e.g., Murdock, supra note 19, a t  921-32; Comment, Sterilization of Mental 
Defectives: Compulsion and Consent, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 179-86 (1975). 
State regulation of certain fundamental rights can be justified only by a compelling 
state interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U S .  113, 155 (1973). Procreation has been recognized as 
such a right. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U S .  678, 685-86 (1977). 
25. E.g., Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968) (action by county health 
officer and local medical society). 
26. E.g., In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974) (parents sought sterilization of 13- 
year-old retarded girl). 
27. E.g., Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974) (peti- 
tioner was the father and legal guardian of adult incompetent). 
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of a court, in the absence of specific statutory authorization, to 
order it.2R 
A few courts have found sufficient authority to grant such 
petitions. In the 1976 case of In re Sallmaier,29 the court relied on 
its parens patriae powers to authorize the sterilization of a men- 
tally retarded woman, although no state statute authorized such 
an order. In approving the sterilization requested by the mother 
of the twenty-three-year-old incompetent, the court explained 
that the rationale of parens patriae is that "the state must inter- 
vene in order to protect an individual who is not able to make 
decisions in his own best interest."30 Finding the proposed sterili- 
zation to be in the best interest of the incompetent, the court 
authorized the ~ p e r a t i o n . ~ ~  
- - 
28. In Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978), the United States Supreme Court 
held that an Indiana judge acted within his jurisdiction in entertaining a petition by a 
mother to authorize the sterilization of her minor child. Because the judge could properly 
consider such a petition, the judge was protected from civil liability for any order made 
in disposing of the petition by an absolute judicial immunity. The Court did not consider 
whether the decision to order the sterilization was a proper exercise of jurisdiction, how- 
ever, nor did it discuss the propriety of the order in light of the consent of the child's 
mother. 
29. 85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
30. Id. a t  297, 378 N.Y.S.2d at  991 (quoting In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 756, 
360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1974)). 
31. 85 Misc. 2d at  297-98, 378 N.Y.S.2d a t  991. 
The conclusion reached by the Sallmaier court is open to criticism on the ground that 
the court based its decision on questionable authority. The court found its jurisdiction to 
order the sterilization in the "common law jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to act as 
parens patriae with respect to incompetents." Id. a t  297, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 991. The court 
explained the rationale of parens patriae by citing In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360 
N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. 1974): 
[ v h e  State must intervene in order to protect an individual who is not able 
to make decisions in his own best interest. The decision to exercise the power 
of parens patriae must reflect the welfare of society, as a whole, but mainly it 
must balance the individual's right to be free from interference against the 
individual's need to be treated, if treatment would in fact be in his best interest. 
Id. at  756, 360 N.Y.S.2d at  786. 
The court in Weberlist wrestled with the scope of the state's parens patriae powers. 
It concluded that its responsibility was to decide what the incompetent ward would choose 
if he were in a position to make a sound judgment. Accordingly, the court authorized 
dental work, hand surgery, surgery for the cleft palate and jaw, and intracranial surgery 
for facial restoration for the retarded ward. The court heard evidence that these operations 
would provide the ward's only chance to live a life outside of an institution. Because no 
person with a close family relationship could be located to consent to the surgery, the court 
felt that its parens patriae position in relation to the 22-year-old retarded man allowed it  
to consent for him. 
The Weberlist court was not faced with an operation of the same magnitude as a 
sterilization operation. Rather, it was dealing with an operation which could only be 
beneficial, and of the type which courts have traditionally allowed parents to have per- 
formed on their children. Extracting from this case the principle that a court may author- 
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In In re S i m p ~ o n , ~ ~  probably the only other reported case 
wherein general equitable powers were invoked to order the steri- 
lization of a feebleminded girl, the court relied on both statutory 
and general equitable powers.33 The precedential value of this 
decision has been clouded, however, by subsequent federal court 
decisions. Nearly ten years after Simpson a federal court ruled in 
Wade u. Bethesda Hospital34 that the Simpson judge was civilly 
liable to another feebleminded girl who had been sterilized pur- 
suant to court order under circumstances similar to Simpson. The 
court held that a statutory grant of "plenary power a t  law and in 
equity fully to dispose of any matter properly before the court" 
was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the judge to order the 
sterilization of a feebleminded 17-year-old girl.35 Finding that the 
judge acted "wholly without jurisdiction," the court ruled that he 
was not protected by judicial immunity and could, therefore, be 
held liable for having ordered the s ter i l iza t i~n.~~ This decision 
minimized the precedential value of Simpson. But, the Wade 
holding has since been called into serious question by a recent 
Supreme Court ruling. 
In Stump v. S p ~ r k r n a n ~ ~  the United States Supreme Court 
overturned a decision of the Seventh Circuit which had applied 
the logic of Wade to deny judicial immunity to a judge who had 
authorized the sterilization of a 15-year-old allegedly retarded girl 
upon the petition of her mother.38 In reversing the Seventh Cir- 
cuit, the Supreme Court ruled that a statutory conferral of 
"original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases a t  law and in equity 
whatsoever" was sufficiently broad to clothe the judge with abso- 
lute judicial immunity in ruling on a petition for ~terilization.~' 
Although this decsion indicates that the denial of judicial im- 
munity in Wade may have been erroneous, it does not address the 
question of whether a court may properly order the sterilization 
of any person without specific statutory authorization. Rather, i t  
holds that a broad conferral of statutory jurisdiction assures that 
ize the sterilization of a retarded ward solely on the basis of its parens patriae power is 
questionable at best. 
32. 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962). 
33. Id. at 207-08. 
34. 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971). 
35. Id. at 673-74. 
36. Id. at 674. 
37. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978). 
38. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), reu'd sub norn. Stump v. 
Sparkman, 98 S .  Ct. 1099 (1978). 
39. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105 (1978). 
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a court may properly consider a petition requesting sterilization, 
so as to relieve a judge from liability for any order he might make 
in acting upon the petition. But while a judge may not be held 
liable for ordering sterilization in such circumstances, the Court 
did not indicate whether it was a proper exercise of the general 
equitable powers of a court to make such an order. 
Implicit support for the theory advanced in Sallmaier and 
Simpson can arguably be found in Wyatt v. Aderholt.'O In that 
case a federal district court judge set up standards and procedural 
due process safeguards to be followed by Alabama authorities in 
having retarded inmates of public institutions sterilized. The 
standards were promulgated and sterilizations implicitly con- 
doned even though Alabama's compulsory sterilization statute 
had been declared uncon~titutional.~~ It is not likely, however, 
that the court intended to assert that the inherent, nonstatutory 
power of a court includes the power to order the sterilization of a 
mentally retarded person; the problem created by the absence of 
valid statutory authorization was not addressed by the court." 
The weight of authority is to the effect that courts do not 
possess inherent or equitable nonstatutory power to authorize 
involuntary sterilization of any person.43 The Missouri Supreme 
Court, for example, stated that the "awesome power" to deny a 
child the right of procreation may not be inferred from the general 
40. 368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974). 
41. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973). 
42. In the first of the two Aderholt cases, 368 F .  Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973), a three- 
judge district court held unconstitutional an Alabama statute which permitted the sterili- 
zation of mentally retarded inmates of public institutions at  the unfettered discretion of 
the officials of such institutions, because the statute contained no requirements of notice, 
hearing, or other procedural safeguards. In the second case, less than three weeks later, 
the single-judge district court found it necessary to establish standards and safeguards to 
be followed in future sterilizations because, as the court put it, "it appears that steriliza- 
tion continues to be performed in certain instances by the state health authorities." 368 
F. Supp. a t  1384. The court did not address the problem created by the fact that the 
declaration of unconstitutionality left the state with no valid authority to perform any 
sterilization. Rather, it was concerned with establishing standards so that no future sterili- 
zations would be performed without adequate procedural safeguards. The court did not 
explain why it simply failed to enjoin the state authorities from performing all steriliza- 
tions until the legislature could enact a new statute with adequate safeguards. Instead, 
the court performed the legislative function of establishing standards to be followed. The 
court did, however, have the benefit of knowing that the authorized representatives of the 
state approved of the sterilization of mentally retarded inmates. It was the procedure of 
the statute that was found inadequate, not the desired result. 
43. E.g., Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Guardianship 
of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 
579 (Ky. 1968); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); In re D.D., 90 Misc. 2d 236, 
394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sur. Ct. 1977); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). 
3801 STERILIZATION AND PARENTAL AUTHORITY 387 
language of the Missouri juvenile code, even though the child's 
parents might desire the operation." A California appellate court 
likewise refused to find in the "chancery power" of a state probate 
court the power to order the sterilization of an adult incompe- 
tent .45 
The issues dealt with above, however, are not dispositive of 
the main concern of this Comment-the power of parents to have 
their retarded minor children sterilized. The consent of a parent 
to the sterilization of his child cannot render the operation 
"voluntary." Furthermore, the fact that involuntary sterilization 
statutes are generally upheld does not speak to the power of a 
parent, absent statutory authorization, to have a child sterilized. 
Similarly, cases debating the inherent power of a court to sanc- 
tion a nonconsensual sterilization do not resolve the question of 
a parent's inherent power to sanction the procedure. Conse- 
quently, attention will now turn specifically to the common law 
power and control of parents over their children. 
A. Parental Authority Generally 
The rights and duties of parents to protect, care for, main- 
tain, preserve, and educate their children have deep roots in both 
our legal and sociological heritage.46 Furthermore, these natural 
rights are of constitutional dimensions." The United States Su- 
preme Court recognized the sanctity of the parent-child relation- 
ship when it declared, 
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can nei- 
ther supply nor hinder. . . . And it is in recognition of this that 
these decisions have respected the private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter.48 
44. In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470-71 (Mo. 1974). 
45. Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974). 
46. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
651-52 (1972); People v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952); In re 
Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673,685,126 P.2d 765,771 (1942); Hafen, Children's Liberation and 
the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations A bout Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 
1976 B.Y.U. L. R~v.,605, 615-29; Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some 
Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 137 (1972); Note, State Intrusion into Family 
Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1384 n.7 (1974) [herein- 
after cited as State Intrusion]. 
47. See Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976), and United States Su- 
preme Court cases cited therein. 
48. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citation omitted). 
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Another court has said, "A fundamental premise on which our 
society is based is that courts will zealously guard the integrity 
of the parent-child relationship. . . . A parent's right to the 
custody and control of his or her minor child will not be abridged 
except for the most powerful reasons."49 The California Supreme 
Court explained that the right to the custody and control of a 
child "embraces the sum of parental rights with respect to the 
rearing of a child, including its care. It includes . . . the right to 
direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and 
control, education, health, and religion."50 
B. Medical Treatment 
Consistent with the common law attitude toward parental 
authority, decisions regarding the care of a young child and the 
medical and surgical treatment he receives have traditionally 
been made by the parents.51 Consequently, to avoid civil liability, 
parental consent must normally be obtained by medical person- 
nel before a child is treated,52 and the parental consent will not 
normally be ~ h a l l e n g e d . ~ ~  However, although parental discretion 
is broad, it is not absolute. The state as parens patriae, for exam- 
ple, has the duty to protect those who cannot protect them- 
selves.54 Thus, the state may interfere with parental authority 
when parents have unreasonably refused or neglected to provide 
medical treatment essential to the protection of their child's life 
or health.55 Furthermore, the police power of the state enables it 
to safeguard the public health and safety and therefore to compel 
submission to preventive measures such as compulsory vaccina- 
49. In re Welfare of May, 14 Wash. App. 765, 767, 545 P.2d 25, 26 (1976) (citation 
omitted). 
50. Burge v. City of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 617, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (1953). 
51. See Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St.  Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 586, 107 S.E. 785 
(1921). See also Burge v. City of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 617, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (1953); 
Hafen, supra note 46, a t  648-49. 
52. Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1,260 N.W. 99 (1935); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 
126 P.2d 765 (1942); Sexual Sterilization, supra note 23, a t  521. 
In emergency situations, however, parental consent is not required. See Tabor v. 
Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (Ky. 1952); Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 134-35, 136 
N.W. 1106, 1110-11 (1912). See also KAN. STAT. 4 65-2891 (Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 112, § 12F (West Supp. 1977-78). 
53. See In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 
126 P.2d 765 (1942). 
54. Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422,430,114 A.2d 1,5, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 942 (1955). 
55. In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933); In re Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d 
314, 316 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812, 814-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1947). See State Intrusion, supra note 46, a t  1399-1401. 
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t i ~ n ~ ~  or terilization,~' even in the face of parental opposition. 
A parent's power and control over his child's medical treat- 
ment may also be limited by the age and situation of the child 
himself. A minor who is emancipateds8 or mature enough to make 
a competent decisions9 is sometimes recognized as having the 
capacity and right to consent to medical treatment for himself,60 
even though the parent may not approve." The decision to obtain 
an abortion, for example, is a constitutionally protected choice 
even for a minor.'j2 Thus, in Planned Parenthood u. Danf~r th , '~  
probably the first Supreme Court decision to deal squarely with 
conflicting constitutional rights of parents and children in the 
context of medical treatment, the Court invalidated the portion 
of a Missouri abortion statute which required the consent of the 
parents before an abortion could be performed on an unmarried 
minor. The Court determined that it was constitutionally imper- 
missbile for a state to endow the parents with an "absolute, and 
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his 
patient to terminate the patient's pregnan~y."'~ The Court felt 
that "[alny independent interest the parent may have in the 
termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more 
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature 
enough to have become pregnant."" Presumably, a mentally re- 
tarded minor who could satisfy the competency requirement 
would be accorded the same rights. 
It is not clear to what extent this principle is applicable in 
other contexts, nor by what criteria competency is to be mea- 
sured." Nevertheless, it shows the sensitivity of the Supreme 
56. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 
(1905); Dunn, The Availability of Abortion, Sterilization, and Other Medical Teatment 
for Minor Patients, 44 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (1975). Cf. Dowel1 v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 
859 (Okla. 1954) (fluoridation of city water supply), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955). 
57. Note 16 and accompanying text supra. 
58. For a discussion of emancipation statutes, see Dunn, supra note 56, a t  5-7. 
59. For a discussion of the "mature minor" concept, see Wadlington, Minors and 
Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 117-20 (1973). 
60. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. 
& School of Nursing, 205 Kan. 292, 300-02, 469 P.2d 330, 337 (1970); Bakker v. Welsh, 
144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S. 
575 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935); Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16,21-22,431 P.2d 719,723 (1967). 
61. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,72-75 (1976); In re Green, 
448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972). 
62. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976). 
63. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
64. Id. at  74. 
65. Id. at 75. 
66. The implications of the competency standard used in Danforth are far from clear. 
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Court to the rights of competent minor children to participate in 
decisions regarding their own medical treatment, and at the same 
time emphasizes that parents do not have absolute control over 
their children in all situations. 
C .  Sterilization of Retarded Children 
A parent's attempt to have a retarded child sterilized arises 
in a different context than the situations considered thus far. 
When parental discretion regarding medical treatment for chil- 
dren is formally challenged in court, the allegation is usually that 
the parents have failed to provide or have refused to allow certain 
medical treatment for their children deemed appropriate or nec- 
essary by a third party. Much less common are cases challenging 
the adequacy of parental consent when parents have sought to 
obtain or have consented to surgical treatment for their children. 
Presumably this is because the parents' decision seldom comes to 
the attention of many other people; there are seldom external 
indications that something is amiss, as there are when a parent 
refuses to provide necessary treatment. 
Most cases dealing with the adequacy of parental consent to 
medical treatment of minor children arise when a doctor refuses 
to provide requested services and the parents petition the court 
to authorize or order the treatment. As noted above, these deci- 
sions have usually turned on the court's authority or jurisdiction 
to order the treatment and not on the capacity of the parents to 
consent. Nevertheless, despite the infrequency of decisions deal- 
ing directly with the capacity of parents to authorize surgical 
treatment which is not clearly in the child's best interests, some 
cases have dealt with this question, although often by implication 
only. The decisions are not uniform, however, either in the sterili- 
zation context or as to other surgical  measure^.^' 
The Court speaks in terms of the "right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough 
to have become pregnant," id., but it is unlikely that the Court meant to establish a 
puberty standard of competence. This becomes evident in light of the Court's subsequent 
emphasis of the fact that the holding "does not suggest that every minor, regardless of 
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy."Id. 
67. In In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 284 So. 2d 338 
(La. 1973), the court held that neither the parents nor the court could authorize the sur- 
gical removal of a kidney from a 17-year-old retarded boy for the purpose of donating it 
to his sister. In Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969), however, the inherent 
chancery powers of the court were found sufficient upon the petition of the mother to 
authorize a kidney transplant for a 27-year-old incompetent to his brother who was dying 
of a fatal kidney disease. Although the incompetent's committee, who was his mother, 
was found to lack the statutory power to authorize the operation, weight was given to the 
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1. Cases implying that a parent may consent 
Although no reported case has ever directly held that parents 
possess the power to authorize the sterilization of their retarded 
children, some courts have implied that such a power exists. In 
Holmes v. Powers,6R for example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
held that no statutory or common law authority permitted the 
sterilization of a 35-year-old mentally retarded woman upon the 
petition of a county health officer and a local medical society. The 
court said, "If, as alleged and proved, the appellee is in fact 
mentally incompetent, she does not have legal capacity to con- 
sent to anything. Nor, at her age, does the law give her parents 
any control of her person or p r ~ p e r t y . " ~ ~  This language has been 
interpreted as implying that a parent could legally consent to the 
sterilization of a mentally retarded minor 
A federal district court for Ohio likewise implied that a par- 
ent's consent might be sufficient to relieve those involved in the 
sterilization of a retarded child from liability. In Wade v. Be- 
thesda H ~ s p i t a l , ~ ~  a feebleminded girl, who had been sterilized 
pursuant to a court order upon petition by the state welfare 
board, brought an action against the judge who had ordered the 
sterilization and seven others who had been involved in the opera- 
tion. The defendants contended that the plaintiff-child had con- 
sented to the operation. The court responded to this contention 
by saying "there is . . . no signed document before this Court 
which demonstrates that either the plaintiff or her parents con- 
sented to the ~ p e r a t i o n . " ~ ~  This language suggests that the writ- 
ten consent of the child's parents could have relieved the defen- 
dants from liability,73 thus implying that the parents could 
properly have had such an operation performed. 
In a 1974 Missouri case, In  re M. K. R.,74 the mother of a 13- 
year-old retarded girl had petitioned the juvenile division of a 
fact that  all the members of the incompetent's immediate family recommended the 
transplant. In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), the court implied that the 
parents of a 15-year-old boy could have authorized skin grafts from their son for the 
benefit of his cousin. Likewise, in Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (1933), the court 
implied that the parents of a minor girl could consent to blood transfusions from their 
daughter for the benefit of another person. 
68. 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968). 
69. Id. a t  580 (emphasis added). 
70. Neuwirth, Capacity, Competence, Consent: Voluntary Sterilization of the Men- 
tally Retarded, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 447, 454 (1974-75). 
71. 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973). 
72. Id. a t  383 (emphasis added). 
73. See text accompanying notes 29-39 supra. 
74. 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974). 
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state circuit court to approve the sterilization of the young girl. 
The father of the child also filed his written consent to the opera- 
tion. The juvenile court, concluding that the sterilization "would 
be conducive to the child's welfare and to the best interests of the 
state," approved the operation.75 The Missouri Supreme Court, 
however, reversed upon a determination that no court in the state 
had the statutory or constitutional authority to sanction such an 
operation." Before reaching this decision, however, the court con- 
sidered and briefly responded to a contention which the girl's 
mother considered to be a "hard-core" question. In the words of 
the mother: 
Is this . . . court prepared to single out sterilization from 
. . . the . . . other medical and surgical procedures . . . which 
parents daily consent [to] and obtain for the benefit of their 
minor children . . . [and thereby presume] to second guess the 
best judgment of the child's own mother, a judgment . . , based 
upon sound medical evidence . . .?77 
The court's answer to this "hard-core question" was a simple 
"no." The court explained that "[ilt is the petitioner who has 
singled out sterilization from those other surgical procedures and 
asked the courts to 'authorize,' or put what petitioner deems to 
be a necessary stamp of approval on her 'best judgment' as to 
what is necessary for her child."78 
This dictum has been interpreted by at least one writer as 
an indication that the court would not have excluded sterilization 
from the operations to which parents can consent on behalf of 
their minor children, so that parents could properly have a child 
sterilized without resort to the court.79 
It is not clear, however, that the court intended to imply 
support for such a position. In a subsequent paragraph, the court 
said: 
The courts are not faced in this case with a prayer for a judg- 
ment authorizing ordinary medical treatment, or radical surgery 
necessary to preserve the life of a child; we are faced with a 
request for sanction by the state of what no doubt is a routine 
75. Id. at 469. 
76. Id. at 470. 
77. Id. at 469. 
78. Id. 
79. Sexual Sterilization, supra note 23, at 521. It is interesting, however, that the 
comment supports the position that sterilization should not be one of the operations for 
which parental consent alone is adequate. 
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operation which would irreversibly deny to a human being a 
fundamental right, the right to bear or beget a child? 
The court was not called upon to decide, nor did it decide, 
whether a parent could properly authorize the sterilization of a 
child without resort to the judiciary. It does appear, however, that 
the court would have given its "stamp of approval" had the 
mother been seeking authorization for ordinary medical treat- 
ment or for radical surgery necessary for the preservation of the 
child's life. It refused, however, to authorize sterilization of a 
retarded child even with the consent of both parents, thereby 
recognizing a distinct difference between sterilization, an opera- 
tion which would permanently terminate a fundamental right, 
and other types of ordinary or necessary medical treatment. 
2. Cases holding or implying that a parent may not consent 
In the only reported case to expressly discuss the power of a 
parent to subject a minor child to sexual sterilization, A. L. v. 
G.R.H.,81 an Indiana court held that parents do not have the 
common law power to authorize the sterilization of a child for 
reasons other than medical necessity. In that case, the mother of 
a 15-year-old boy of less than normal intelligence sought a declar- . 
atory judgment to the effect that the common law attributes of 
the parent-child relationship endowed her with the right to have 
her son sterilized. The trial court denied the mother the right to 
secure the operation and the court of appeals affirmed." 
The boy involved in this case had an intelligence quotient 
(IQ) of eighty-seven, described as being in the "dull" or 
"borderline" area, only seven points below the normal range. 
Witnesses testified that he had benefitted substantially from spe- 
cial education programs and would be capable of earning his own 
livelihood. Furthermore, evidence showed that his mental disa- 
bility would not be transmittable to offspring and that he was 
intelligent enough to participate in a decision about steriliza- 
tion." The court, no doubt influenced somewhat by these factors, 
expressly held that parents do not have the inherent power to 
authorize the sterilization of their retarded minor children. 
In the course of its decision, the appellate court pointed out 
that: (1) there was no legislative enactment which would permit 
- -- - 
80. 515 S.W.2d at 470. 
81. 325 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. App. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.  936 (1976). 
82. 325 N.E.2d at 502. 
83. Id. at 501-02. 
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sterilization under the circumstances of the case; (2) the facts did 
not bring the case within the framework of the decisions recogniz- 
ing that a parent may consent to necessary medical services on 
behalf of the child; and (3) the case did not present a situation 
where the state may intervene over the parent's wishes to rescue 
a child from parental neglect or to save its life?' The court recog- 
nized that the desirability of the proposed operation did not ema- 
nate from any lifesaving necessity, but rather that the sole pur- 
pose of the operation was to prevent the boy's capability of father- 
ing children.85 The court concluded, "We believe the common law 
does not invest parents with such power over their children even 
though they sincerely believe the child's adulthood would benefit 
therefrom 
Implicit support for this conclusion can be found in a variety 
of cases. In In re D.D.,87 for example, a New York Surrogate 
Court denied the application of a mother seeking to have her 16- 
year-old mentally retarded daughter sterilized. The girl, although 
attractive and well developed, functioned below the level of a 
5-year-old because of severe mental retardation." Although the 
application was denied because the court found no statutory 
power to authorize such an operation, the case is noteworthy 
because the court gave little deference to the fact that the peti- 
tioner was the mother of the minor girl. The court did not even 
suggest that her position as a parent endowed her with the inher- 
ent authority to consent to the procedure. 
In Relf v. Weinberger," a federal district court declared that 
federal funds could not be used to provide for the sterilization of 
any person who is incompetent to consent to such an operation 
because of minority or mental deficiency. The court explained 
that the decision was based on statutory interpretation. The fam- 
ily planning sections of the federal statutes in question required 
a voluntary consent to such an operation? The court felt that no 
incompetent person could provide such a consent, and that the 
consent of a representative could not impute voluntariness to the 
person being sterilized? Under this rationale, parental consent to 
84. Id. at 502. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. 90 Misc. 2d 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sur. Ct. 1977). 
88. Id. at 236, 394 N.Y .S.Bd at 140. 
89. 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974). 
90. Public Health Service Act § 1007, 42 U.S.C. 4 300a-5 (1970); Social Security Act 
§§  402(2)(15), 508(a), 1905 (a)(4), 42 U.S.C. §§  602(a)(15), 708(a), 1396d(a)(4) (1970). 
91. 372 F. Supp. at 1202. 
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the sterilization of a child would not make it a voluntary steriliza- 
tion. 
Another federal district court invalidated a portion of the 
North Carolina sterilization statute because it provided that ster- 
ilization proceedings must be instituted whenever the next of kin 
or legal guardian of a retarded person so requested." The court 
invalidated this provision because "it grants to the retarded per- 
son's next of kin or legal guardian the power of a tyrant: for any 
reason, or for no reason at all, he may require an otherwise re- 
sponsible public servant to initiate the procedure."" The provi- 
sion was declared unconstitutional as an "arbitrary and capri- 
cious delegation of unbridled power."" Although a retarded 
child's next of kin will normally be his parents, the court refused 
to allow them to have the power to require the initiation of sterili- 
zation  proceeding^.^^ 
Another court, in establishing standards to be followed by 
Alabama state health authorities whenever a resident of a state 
retardation facility was to be sterilized, totally banned the sterili- 
zation of any resident who had not obtained the chronological age 
of 21 years except in cases of medical neces~ity.~Wo exception 
was made for the sterilization of any such person upon the par- 
ents' request or consent. 
~ h e i e  cases suggest that parental consent alone is not suffi- 
cient to authorize the sterilization of a retarded child, a t  least 
when governmental agencies are involved. However, with only 
one case expressly declaring that parents do not possess the power 
to have their children sterilized, and other cases containing impli- 
cations both ways, one would be bold, if not presumptuous, to 
assert a definitive common law doctrine on the precise issue. 
Nevertheless, A.L. v. G.R.H. and the other more recent cases 
seem to show the modern trend. In light of the continually ex- 
panding recognition of the constitutional rights of children and 
the mentally retarded, it appears to be a reasonable assumption 
that most courts would not recognize parental authority to the 
extent of allowing a parent to have any retarded child sterilized 
at  will. 
92. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 
455-56 (M.D.N.C. 1976). 
93. Id. at 456 (emphasis in original). 
94. Id. 
95. It should be noted, however, that the court implied that the breadth of the 
delegation was the major infirmity. "We think such confidence in all next of kin and all 
legal guardians is misplaced . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original). 
96. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383, 1384 (M.D. Ala. 1974). 
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Although the power of a parent to have his mentally retarded 
minor child sterilized appears never to have been fully recognized 
by the courts, and the current trend is away from recognizing 
such power, inquiry as to whether parents should have such power 
is still relevant. Many courts may still have to pass on the ques- 
tion and legislatures may also have to decide whether to grant 
such power by statute. In addition, although corroborating statis- 
tics are difficult to obtain, it appears that many retarded children 
are still being sterilized upon the consent of their parents without 
resort to the courts and without statutory authorization." Tacitly 
recognizing parental power to this extent may jeopardize the 
basic right of a retarded child to procreate. On the other hand, 
denying the power may interfere with parental discretion and the 
right of the child to have his parents act in his best interests in 
all situations. It is with these facts in mind that attention will 
now be turned to a discussion of the more relevant policy consid- 
erations. 
A. Policy Considerations Favoring Parental Authority 
As discussed above, parents have a constitutional right to the 
custody, care, and control of their minor children? Although this 
right is not absolute, parental discretion as to the proper medical 
treatment for any child should not be interfered with in the ab- 
sence of compelling reasons. In addition to the parental rights 
involved, the rights of a retarded child would also be impaired if 
his parents were denied the power to have a necessary or benefi- 
cial sterilization performed. And sterilization may indeed be ben- 
eficial for a retarded child in some  situation^.^^ Under such cir- 
cumstances, the inability of parents to obtain a sterilization for 
their child would frustrate the rights and best interests of every- 
one involved. 
Additionally, even if a statutory procedure were designed to 
provide for the sterilization of retarded children, it would neces- 
sarily entail state interference with parental discretion and fam- 
ily privacy. And state interference with familial affairs ofttimes 
produces worse results than no intervention at  all.lw One court 
97. See Ferster, supra note 19, at 605; Murdock, supra note 19, at 918-19, 932. 
98. Notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra. 
99. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 
454-55 (1976); Sexual Sterilization, supra note 23, at 515-20. 
100. See Green & Paul, Parenthood and the Mentally Retarded, 24 U .  TORONTO L.J. 
117, 123-24 (1974); Hafen, supra note 46, at 655-56. 
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recently explained, "Modern theories of child welfare . . . offer 
persuasive support to parental rights, and suggest that the legal 
system should generally defer to the wishes of a child's parents, 
obliging the state to bear a serious burden of justification before 
intervention."lol Sterilization is an operation with far-reaching 
consequences and parents certainly should be in the best position 
to evaluate these consequences in terms of their children's best 
interests. lo2 
Furthermore, it would be in keeping with the common beliefs 
and assumptions of the general populace to recognize parents as 
possessing the power and ability to have a retarded child steri- 
lized when they feel it is desirable and beneficial for the child.lo3 
Many parents would likely be offended at  the suggestion that 
unless the state gives them the power they may not have a re- 
tarded child sterilized even when they and their doctor feel it 
would be desirable. 
The requirement of parental consent for medical treatment 
of a minor is based largely on the assumption that a child lacks 
the knowledge, maturity, and intelligence necessary to reach a 
decision concerning his own best interests.lo4 Because sterilization 
involves a fundamentally important right and because most chil- 
dren will be able to decide for themselves a t  a later date whether 
or not they wish to be sterilized, most would agree that the deci- 
sion should be left for the children to make when they are compe- 
tent to make it. Some retarded children, however, will never be 
able to make a competent decision regarding sterilization. It 
seems natural, therefore, to conclude that in such a situation the 
parents, who are presumed to be acting in the best interests of 
the child, should be able to make the decision for the child. 
Viewing only the above policies, the ideal solution would 
seem to be a legislative enactment granting parents the authority 
to consent to the sterilization of a retraded child when they feel 
it would be in the child's best interests, with no further state 
involvement at all-provide statutory authorization and leave 
the decision with the parents. The validity of such legislation, 
however, would certainly be questionable in light of recent Su- 
preme Court declarations that blanket parental consent require- 
101. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976) (quoting State Intrusion, 
supra note 46, at 1385). 
102. See In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 109, 221 S.E.2d 307, 316 (1976). 
103. See State Intrusion, supra note 46, at 1384 n.7. 
104. See Dunn, supra note 56, at 2. 
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ments are impermissible in statutes dealing with procreation.lo5 
Moreover, there are several countervailing considerations sug- 
gesting that parents should not possess unfettered discretion to 
have a retarded child sterilized, whether it is statutorily author- 
ized or not. Attention will now be turned to a discussion of several 
such considerations. 
B. Policy Considerations Against Parental Authority 
I .  Procreation as a fundamental right 
Many have argued that an operation which would perma- 
nently terminate the ability of a child to reproduce should not be 
among the medical procedures that a parent can routinely au- 
thorize for a mentally retarded child.lo6 Most people would cer- 
tainly agree that a parent should not have the right to withhold 
medical treatment which would save the life of his child or au- 
thorize treatment which would unreasonably endanger it. The 
child's fundamental right to life itself surely outweighs any con- 
flicting parental interest. Although of a different magnitude than 
the right to life itself, sterilization likewise threatens a fundamen- 
tal right, the right to procreate.lo7 The right of privacy as it per- 
tains to matters concerning procreation is a right protected 
against unwarranted state infringement for all, whether minors or 
adults.lo8 The sterilization of a child, be he retarded nor not, irre- 
versibly denies him this fundamental right to bear or beget 
children. 
Although a parent's discretion as to medical treatment for a 
retarded child should be broad, the child's fundamental right to 
procreate is arguably superior. To deny a parent the unfettered 
105. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 US.  678, 693-94 (1977) (opinion of Bren- 
nan, J., with three Justices concurring in the opinion, six Justices concurring in the 
result); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976). 
A statutory provision giving parents an absolute veto power over a competent minor's 
decision to be sterilized would likely be invalidated under the Danforth test. However, a 
sterilization statute containing a parental consent element which also provides a check 
against unfettered parental discretion would likely withstand judicial scrutiny. See note 
150 infra. 
106. Green & Paul, supra note 100, at 122-24; Neuwirth, supra note 70, at 455; Sexual 
Sterilization, supra note 23, at 521-22. Attorney General opinions of at least two states 
have concluded that a mentally deficient person may not normally be sterilized upon the 
application or consent of the parents. See 1943 ATT'Y GEN. REP. 336 (N.Y.); Ferster, supra 
note 19, at 605. 
107. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
541 (1942); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Mo. 1974). 
108. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 US.  678, 692-93 (1977) (Brennan, J., with 
three Justices concurring); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976). 
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right to have a child sterilized is to infringe on his discretion 
somewhat. To deny a child the power of procreation is to destroy 
the possibility of his ever exercising and enjoying the rights and 
duties of parenthood. Although the interests of the parents in 
seeking the sterilization of their retarded child need not always 
conflict with the best interests of the child, it is apparent that 
these interests can and do conflict in many circumstances. Com- 
mon sense would seem to dictate the conclusion that if the rights 
and interests of the parents conflict with those of the child in this 
area, the child's right to procreate should prevail. 
The presumption that a parent will look to and protect the 
best interests of his children is implicit in the theory that a parent 
has the right to authorize surgical treatment for them.lo9 As to a 
mentally retarded child, however, this presumption may not al- 
ways be justified. Although one should not be quick to decry the 
motives of a parent who seeks to have his retarded child steri- 
lized, there are many possible concerns and situations which 
could lead the interests of the parents into conflict with the best 
interests of the child.l1° The social stigma attached to reproduc- 
tion by retarded persons, for example, could lead a parent to seek 
to have his retarded child sterilized, as could the desire to prevent 
the possible future birth of retarded grandchildren. Economic 
concerns could likewise be the motivation behind a desired sterili- 
zation. The parent would very likely have to finance the prenatal 
expenses as well as the medical and hospital expenses of the 
actual birth. Furthermore, the retarded child could prove to be 
an unfit parent and lack adequate economic means to properly 
provide for the child, causing the burden of raising and providing 
for the child to fall on the grandparents. 
Hygienic concerns might also make sterilization an attrac- 
tive alternative to the parents. Sterilization can certainly help 
solve some menstrual problems and it has been claimed that 
sterilization can also help with problems such as excessive mas- 
turbation and excessive body hair and acne.lll A parent seeking 
to sterilize a retarded child might simply be acting out of overpro- 
tectiveness common among many parents of retarded children, or 
at the other extreme, out of hostility or frustration stemming from 
the added pressures of having to care for a retarded child. 
109. See In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 109, 221 S.E.2d 307, 316 (1976); 
Murdock, supra note 19, at 932. 
110. Murdock, supra note 19, at 932-33; Neuwirth, supra note 70, at 455; Sexual 
Sterilization, supra note 23, at  522. 
111. See Ferster, supra note 19, at 605. 
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The "true" motivation behind a parent's decision to sterilize 
a retarded child, of course, would likely be a combination of many 
factors and concerns. It is not contended that each of the possible 
motivations described above is an improper motive or that every 
one of them would tend to be in derogation of the child's best 
interests. It is contended, however, that in view of the fundamen- 
tal nature of the right to procreate, some such motivations are 
improper. Adequate safeguards should, therefore, be required to 
ensure that before any person is sterilized all relevant factors 
have been properly considered so that the operation does in fact 
tend to reflect the best interests and welfare of the person to be 
sterilized,l12 or is pursuant to a voluntary, competent consent of 
such person, or is justified on some other acceptable ground.l13 
The fundamental nature of the right involved requires at least 
this much protection. 
2. Problems in labeling 
Even if it was conceded, arguendo, that a parent should pos- 
sess the power to have a retarded child sterilized, a major prob- 
lem persists in determining when a child is so "retarded" as to 
justify sterilization. It is not an easy task to distinguish between 
a "normal" child and a "retarded" child or between competency 
and incompetency. In fact, the term "mentally retarded" has 
very little meaning."' It describes a very broad class of people and 
does not distinguish between differing causes of retardation, de- 
grees of intellectual, mental and social capabilities, or prospects 
112. This Comment does not purport to define precisely what is involved in a deter- 
mination of the "best interests of the child." It would seem, however, that in reaching a 
decision as to the child's best interests in the context of sexual sterilization, at least the 
following factors should be taken into consideration: (1) the desires of the child's parents 
and the reasons for such desires; (2) the child's ability to understand the nature and 
consequences of the operation; (3) the child's desires; (4) the child's potentiality of devel- 
oping into a fit parent; (5) the physical and psychological impact the proposed operation 
could have on the child; and (6) the availability of a less drastic alternative which would 
accomplish the desired result. Unless these factors are given proper weight and unless the 
operation would tend to genuinely promote the child's best welfare, sterilization would be 
improper and unjustifiable. 
113. Various interests have been recognized by courts and commentators as legiti- 
mate state interests which would justify the sterilization of mental incompetents under 
certain circumstances. E.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Caro- 
lina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 457-58 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (to prevent the birth of a defective child 
or the birth of a nondefective child to unfit parents); In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 
95, 103, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976) (interest of the unborn child, and the interest in 
preventing the procreation of children who will become a burden on the state). See also 
notes 13-24 and accompanying text supra. 
114. PRESIDENT'S COMMMTEE ON MENTAL R~ARDATION, NEW NEIGHBORS 27 (1974). 
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for future improvement.l15 An Illinois court correctly surmised, 
"[tlhere is no clear dividing line between competency and in- 
competency, and each case must be judged by its own peculiar 
facts."l16 
Disenchantment with the use of the IQ as the main criterion 
for determining whether or not a person is retarded has brought 
the labeling and diagnosis of retardation under increasing scru- 
tiny."' IQ is considered by many to be an inept indicator of a 
person's potential and an inaccurate measure of a person's pres- 
ent functional ability.l18 Indeed, many children labeled in their 
youth as retarded are in adult life indistinguishable from the 
unretarded and display increased and even normal intellectual 
competence.119 Furthermore, studies have disclosed that there is 
a pronounced "cultural bias" in the standard IQ tests? 
Another critical consideration is that "retardation" is not 
necessarily co-extensive with inadequacy as a parent? Nearly 
ninety percent of the mentally retarded persons in the United 
States are only "mildly" retardedlZ2 and are referred to as 
"educable" mentally retarded? Many may have normal chil- 
dren and function as adequate parents, especially after education 
and training to that end.lz4 As one court explained, "It is a matter 
of common knowledge that many married men or women con- 
tinue in a satisfactory marital status although they may not pos- 
sess high grade mentality or be successful in the conduct of busi- 
ness ventures . . . . "125 
115. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 
454 (M .D.N .C . 1976). See also PRESIDENT'S COMM~ITEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION: CENTURY 
OF DECISION 6 (1976). 
116. Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 332, 40 N.E.2d 85, 88 (1942). 
117. See R. WOODY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 10-19 (1974); Roos, 
Mentally Retarded Citizens: Challenge for the 19709s, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1059, 1070-71 
(1972). 
118. See PRESIDENT'S COMMIT~EE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 2, a t  137; Mur- 
dock, supra note 19, a t  928-29 n.67; Roos, supra note 117, a t  1070-71. 
119. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 2, at 138; Green & 
Paul, supra note 100, a t  123; 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 424 (1969). 
120. P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd per curium, 502 F.2d 
963 (9th Cir. 1974); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 484-85 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub 
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); S. SARASON & J. DORIS, PSYCHOLOGI- 
CAL PROBLEMS IN MENTAL DEFICIENCY 289-311 (4th ed. 1969). 
121. See Ferster, supra note 19, a t  624; Murdock, supra note 19, at 929-30, 933. 
122. E. OGG, SECURING THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF ~ A R D E D  PERSONS 2 (Public Affairs 
Pamphlet No. 492, 1973); Murdock, supra note 19, a t  928. 
123. MENTAL RETARDATION: A BASIC GUIDE 151-55 (H. Love ed. 1968) [hereinafter 
cited as MENTAL RETARDATION]; E. OGG, Supra note 122, a t  3. 
124. See Murdock, supra note 19, a t  928-32. See also In re Welfare of May, 14 Wash. 
App. 765, 768-69,545 P;2d 25, 27 (1976); MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 123, a t  151-55. 
125. Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 335, 40 N.E.2d 85, 89 (1942). 
402 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
Furthermore, retardation does not preclude the capacity to 
give an informed ~ 0 n s e n t . l ~ ~  Courts have found persons with lim- 
ited mental capacity able to give a legally binding consent to such 
things as marriage,ln sexual intercourse,128 and adoption.ln The 
oft used test for determining the ability of a mentally handi- 
capped person to enter into a legal relationship or otherwise give 
a binding consent is whether the person possesses "sufficient 
mental capacity to understand the nature, effect, duties and obli- 
gations" of the relationship.130 Many mentally retarded persons 
can understand and appreciate the responsibilities of parenthood, 
as well as the implications of sterilization.131 In fact, one author 
has asserted that "the state may rarely confront a retarded indi- 
vidual who should be sterilized, but who lacks the capacity to 
consent 
If the legal capacity to consent to sterilization exists, or if it 
could possibly develop as the child matures, the retarded person 
should be on a par with any other person. That is, he should have 
the right to be sterilized if he so desires, but he should not be 
subject to sterilization against his will unless it is pursuant to a 
valid compulsory sterilization statute. The unsatisfactory, unreli- 
able, and biased tests used in labeling retardation, the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of mentally retarded persons are only 
mildly retarded and many can be adequate parents, and the fact 
that many persons, although retarded, can nonetheless meet the 
requirements of legal competency to consent to sterilization, 
makes the unfettered power to terminate a child's right of pro- 
creation simply because he falls into the unfortunate group of 
persons who have been labeled "retarded" seem awesome indeed. 
3. Changing theories of genetics 
The eugenic sterilization movement133 reached its zenith dur- 










Murdock, supra note 19, a t  933; Neuwirth, supra note 70, at 452. 
Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 40 N.E.2d 85 (1942). 
Hacker v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 119, 118 P.2d 408 (1941). 
In re Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass. 230, 181 N.E.2d 836 (1962). 
Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 334, 40 N.E.2d 85, 89 (1942); Hacker v. State, 
Zrim. 119, 118 P.2d 408 (1941). 
See Murdock, supra note 19, a t  933; Neuwirth, supra note 70, at 452. 
Murcock, supra note 19, at 934. 
"Eugenics" involves the concept of improving human stock through regulation 
of heredity.   he term was coined by Sir Francis Galton in the 19th century from the Greek 
word, eugenes, meaning "well-born." Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 
46 DEN. L.J. 631, 631 (1969). 
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twentieth centuries.ls4 The main impetus for the eugenics move- 
ment began with Sir Francis Galton and involved the principles 
of social Darwinism and Mendelian genetics.ls5 The sharp decline 
in recent years of the use of eugenic sterilization laws, however, 
plus the recent reluctance of courts to claim hereditary justifica- 
tions for such statutes, signals the rejection of the view that men- 
tal retardation is hereditary.l3"n other words, the basic premise 
upon which the sterilization of mental defectives has been tradi- 
tionally justified-the belief that heredity is primarily responsi- 
ble for mental retardation-is no longer accepted by the general 
scientific community as to most instances of mental retarda- 
tion.ls7 Statistics show that eighty-nine percent of feebleminded 
persons are born to normal parents.138 Likewise, the President's 
Committee on Mental Retardation concluded that "[a]bnormal 
genes or chromosomes which generate [the] more severe 
[mental] disorders account for 5% or less of the total incidence 
of retardation."ls9 
A federal district court, in recently invalidating parts of a 
North Carolina sterilization statute, explained: "Most competent 
geneticists now reject Social Darwinism and doubt the premise 
implicit in Holmes' incantation that '. . . three generations of 
imbeciles is enough."'140 The court then summarized, "In short, 
the medical and genetical experts are no longer sold on steriliza- 
tion to benefit either retarded patients or the future of the Repub- 
lic."141 These changes in genetic theory cast doubt on the validity 
of compulsory sterilization statutes which were passed and justi- 
fied on the assumed genetic inheritability of mental retarda- 
tion.ld2 Furthermore, the fact that traditional justifications for 
sterilization statutes are breaking down casts doubt on the ac- 
ceptability of any type of involuntary sterilization, reinforcing the 
134. Bligh, Sterilization and Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1965). 
135. Id. at 1060. 
136. See Ferster, supra note 19, at 599; Shaw, Procreation and the Population 
Problem, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1165, 1183 (1977). 
137. See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 
451, 454 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Bligh, supra note 134, at 1062; Ferster, supra note 19, at 596, 
602-04; New Rationale, supra note 17, at 353-56. 
"[Rlesearch has uncovered some 200 causes of retardation, only a fraction of them 
genetic." E. OGG, supra note 122, at 9. 
138. New Rationale, supra note 17, at 353-56. 
139. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 2, at 137. 
140. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 
454 (M.D.N.C. 1976). 
141. Id. 
142. See notes 13-24 and accompanying text supra. 
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argument that an attempt to have any person sterilized at the 
request of another person should be carefully scrutinized and not 
allowed unless the desired operation is completely justified. 
The fundamental nature of the right of procreation, the inad- 
equacies of the methods of labeling retardation, the relative lack 
of reliable indicators of potential for adequate parenthood, the 
noninheritability of most forms of mental retardation, and the 
potential conflicts of interest between a parent and a retarded 
child compel the conclusion that parents should not have the 
unfettered discretion to sterilize their retarded children. 
On the other hand, there are certainly some situations in 
which the sterilization of a retarded child can be justified. Some 
forms of retardation are passed geneti~a1ly.l~~ Some retarded peo- 
ple will never make adequate parents.144 Furthermore, steriliza- 
tion will sometimes be in the best interests of the retarded 
~ h i 1 d . l ~ ~  As one federal court noted, "however doubtful . . . the 
efficacy of sterilization to improve the quality of the human race, 
there is substantial medical opinion that it may be occasionally 
desirable and indicated."146 In any such situation, the total un- 
availability of sterilization for retarded children would breed 
some of the same evils as does its overavailability-the best 
interests and welfare of the child would be frustrated and the 
parents' right to secure beneficial medical treatment for their 
child unreasonably denied. 
Appropriate legislation could be enacted which would resolve 
these problems. Statutory procedures could be drafted which 
would tend to ensure that a child's fundamental right of procrea- 
tion is not unjustifiably denied, yet provide a means whereby 
desirable and justifiable sterilizations could be performed. Such 
a statutory enactment should be upheld as a reasonable exercise 
of the police power of a state as a means of protecting the funda- 
mental rights of minors and the mentally retarded and as a vehi- 
cle through which a parent can exercise his parental discretion by 
utilizing the statutory machinery whenever he feels sterilization 
would be in the best interests of his child. It is with this in mind 
- 
143. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 
454 (M.D.N.C. 1976). 
144. Id. a t  454-55. 
145. Id. a t  455; Sexual Sterilization, supra note 23, a t  519-20. 
146.. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. a t  
454. 
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that the following recommendations are made. No attempt has 
been made to draft a proposed statute in its entirety. The follow- 
ing suggestions, however, represent what are thought to be the 
essentials of a comprehensive statute dealing with this difficult 
area. 14' 
A. Review Committee 
I 
Before any sterilization is performed the person to be steri- 
lized should appear before either a court of competent jurisdic- 
tion or a special committee appointed to review such requests.148 
The parents (of a minor) and/or legal guardian, if appropriate, 
should also appear. 
B. Initial Determinations 
When the person to be sterilized initially appears before the 
committee or court, the following determinations should be 
made: 
1. Whether the person to be sterilized is competent to give 
a knowing, voluntary consent to the 0perati0n.l~~ 
2. If he is found to be competent, whether he knowingly and 
voluntarily consents to the operation. 
3. If the person to be sterilized is a minor, whether the 
parents knowingly and voluntarily consent to the operation. 
C. Voluntary Sterilization 
The sterilization of a person may be considered voluntary 
and thus subject to no further procedural requirements if: 
147. Although this Comment has focused on the sterilization of mentally retarded 
minors, the basic principles and safegurards recommended in the text would seem appro- 
priate for sterilization in any context. 
148. An example of such a review committee can be found in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 
F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974), wherein a federal district court set up procedures to be 
followed before any mentally retarded patient of Alabama retardation facilities could be 
sterilized. The procedures provided that no sterilization of an institutionalized patient 
could be performed without the prior approval of the review committee. The committee 
was to consist of five members to be selected by a human rights committee and approved 
by the court. The committee was to include at  least one licensed physician, one licensed 
attorney, two women, two minority group members, and one resident of the state retarda- 
tion facility. The categories, of course, are not mutually exclusive. Id. at 1384-85. For other 
similar proposals, see Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (D.D.C. 1974); Neu- 
wirth, supra note 70, a t  465. 
149. Standards would need to be adopted to assist in making such a determination. 
Relevant considerations include the person's age, IQ, education, ability to understand the 
nature and consequences of sterilization, ability to communicate, ability to understand 
marriage and parenthood, etc. The traditional presumption of the sanity and competence 
of adults should also apply in this initial hearing. 
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1. The person to be sterilized is competent to consent to the 
operation and does so knowingly and voluntarily, and 
2. Where the person to be sterilized is a minor, his parents 
or guardians also consent. 150 
D . Involuntary Sterilization 
The sterilization of a person should be considered involun- 
tary and thus subject to the procedural requirements set forth 
below if: 
1. The person to be sterilized is not competent to give a 
knowing, voluntary consent, or 
2. The person to be sterilized is competent to give such a 
consent, but does not voluntarily consent thereto, or 
3. The parents or legal guardian do not consent to the steri- 
lization of a minor child or ward.151 
150. A parental consent provision such as this could be considered suspect in light of 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), which held the parental consent 
requirement of an abortion statute unconstitutional. It is believed, however, that the 
provision here would pass judicial scrutiny. As explained in Danforth, the primary infirm- 
ity of the parental consent requirement invalidated therein was its conferral of an absolute 
veto power over the decision of the minor. Id. a t  74. Justice Stewart filed a concurring 
opinion, joined by Justice Powell, to clarify his stand on certain portions of the opinion. 
These two Justices were necessary for the 5-4 majority in this part of the opinion. Justice 
Stewart explained: 
With respect to the state law's requirement of parental consent, 4 3(4), I 
think it clear that its primary constitutional deficiency lies in its imposition of 
an absolute limitation on the minor's right to obtain an abortion. The Court's 
opinion today in Bellotti u. Baird, [428 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1976)], suggests that 
a materially different constitutional issue would be presented under a provision 
requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases but providing for 
prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement between the parent and the 
minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the minor is mature enough to give 
an informed consent without parental concurrence or that abortion in any event 
is in the minor's best interest. Such a provision would not impose parental 
approval as an absolute condition upon the minor's right but would assure in 
most instances consultation between the parent and child. 
428 U.S. a t  90-91 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143- 
51 (1976). 
The parental consent provision proposed here does not impose an absolute veto power 
over a competent minor's decision to be sterilized. Rather, it provides that unless the 
parents are consulted and freely consent to the operation, other procedures are available 
whereby the child's desires may be realized if they are found to be in the child's best 
interest. This procedure would help ensure consultation with parents over this vitally 
important decision to seek sterilization. Such a goal is clearly a constitutionally permissi- 
ble one. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US.  52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concur- 
ring); Id. at 102-05 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Planned Parent- 
hood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 567 (E.D. Penn. 1975). Consequently, the provision 
in the proposed statute would likely withstand constitutional attack in light of the clarifi- 
cation provided by Mr. Justice Stewart in Danforth and the opinion in Bellotti v. Baird, 
428 U S .  132 (1976). 
151. See note 150 supra. 
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E. Requirements for Involuntary Sterilization 
The following requirements should be satisfied before any 
involuntary sterilization may be performed: ls2 
1. The person to be sterilized must be given a full hearing 
before the court or committee. 
2. Adequate notice of such hearing must be given to the 
person to be sterilized and to the parents of such person if he is a 
minor, and to the guardian, if any. 
3. The person to be sterilized must be represented by coun- 
sel at such hearing, either appointed or approved by the court or 
committee. 
4. The person to be sterilized shall have the right to cross- 
examination, to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and 
to testify for himself. 
5. Evidence, including medical and psychological testi- 
mony, must be received by the court or committee regarding (a) 
the likely impact of the proposed sterilization on the person to be 
sterilized, (b) relevant factors indicating the desirability or unde- 
sirability of the operation, and (c) the reasons why less drastic 
alternative procedures would not be adequate. 
6. The court or committee must find that the proposed 
operation would be in the best interests of the person to be steri- 
lized or of society. 
7. The determination of the court or committee must be 
appealable to the state appellate courts. 
A statute incorporating these basic elements would ade- 
quately protect the important interests of all parties concerned. 
A competent adult could obtain a sterilization almost summarily. 
A minor would be encouraged to consult his parents and obtain 
their consent before undergoing an irreversible sterilization, but 
he would be able to obtain the operation without their consent 
under appropriate circumstances. The parents of a retarded child 
could secure the sterilization of their child upon a showing that 
it was justifiable and desirable. A retarded child would be pro- 
tected, however, against sterilization at  the whim of his parents 
or other persons. Such a procedure, by paying due deference to 
the important interests involved, would protect one of the most 
basic and cherished rights of mankind: the right to bear or beget 
children. 
Gary A. Dodge 
152. These requirements represent the basic due process safeguards necessary in such 
a proceeding. See note 20 supra. 
